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I. INTRODUCTION
T is an uncontested fact that federal and state enforcement
lagencies continue to devote increasing resources to the investi-
gation and prosecution of corporate criminal environmental vio-
lations. ' In this day and age of budget cuts and hiring freezes, the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has re-
t Linda Richenderfer is an associate in the Litigation Department of the
Philadelphia law firm of Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, where she is a member of
the Civil and Criminal Government Enforcement Group. Ms. Richenderfer is a
1984 graduate of Villanova Law School.
Neil R. Bigioni is an associate in the Environmental Department of Saul,
Ewing, Remick & Saul. Mr. Bigioni is a 1990 graduate of the University of Penn-
sylvania School of Law.
1. Statistics released by the Environmental Crimes Section of the Depart-
ment ofJustice (DOJ) show dramatic increases in the number of environmental
criminal indictments and pleas/convictions from fiscal year 1983 through Au-
gust 1989. The dollar value of fines imposed, the total jail time and time of
actual confinement have also demonstrated net positive increases during the
same period. See 3 Corp. Crim. Liab. Rep. 27, 27-28 (1989).
(71)
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ceived a Congressional mandate to increase the number of crimi-
nal investigators working on environmental violations.2 Despite
these staff increases, both EPA and the United States Department
ofJustice (DOJ) recognize that it is still impossible to monitor the
regulated public at all times. 3 This is in part due to the countless
number of businesses that comprise the environmentally regu-
lated community and the limitless scope of regulated behavior.
Corporate self-policing, by necessity, must be part of any suc-
2. See Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-593, 104 Stat.
2962, Nov. 16, 1990, Title II, §§ 202-205. Section 202 requires the EPA Admin-
istrator to ensure that the number of criminal investigators assigned to the EPA
Office of Criminal Investigation meet the following staffing levels:
(1) 72 criminal investigators for the period October 1, 1991 through September
30, 1992;
(2) 110 criminal investigators for the period October 1, 1992 through Septem-
ber 30, 1993;
(3) 123 criminal investigators for the period October 1, 1993 through Septem-
ber 30, 1994;
(4) 160 criminal investigators for the period October 1, 1994 through Septem-
ber 30, 1995; and
(5) 200 criminal investigators for the period beginning October 1, 1995.
In addition, for fiscal years 1991-1995, the Administrator must increase the
number of support staff assigned to the Office of Criminal Investigations.
The Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990 not only mandates the hiring of ad-
ditional criminal investigators, but also requires the training of current and fu-
ture federal and state enforcement employees. Section 204 of the Act requires
that by September 30, 1991 the EPA Administrator establish a National Enforce-
ment Training Institute within the Office of Enforcement. The purpose of the
Institute is "to train Federal, State and local lawyers, inspectors, civil and crimi-
nal investigators and technical experts in the enforcement of the Nation's envi-
ronmental laws." Id. § 204.
Concomitantly, the EPA has placed increased emphasis on coordinating
civil and criminal case management in Regional Offices, joining forces with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DOJ. See James M. Strock, Assistant
Administrator for Enforcement, U.S. EPA, Enforcement Priorities for 1990, Materi-
als Presented at American Bar Association White Collar Crimes 1990 Confer-
ences at 3-4 (March 1, 1990) (on file with authors). To coordinate cases with the
United States Attorney Office, EPA has also created, in each of its Regional Of-
fices, the position of Regional Enforcement Coordinator. Id. As part of this
cooperative effort, an agreement was signed on October 7, 1991, specifying the
roles to be played by the EPA and FBI in criminal investigations. See Toxics L.
Rep. (BNA) 709 (Nov. 6, 1991).
Briefly, this agreement sets forth the procedures for ensuring a free ex-
change of information between the FBI and EPA during criminal environmental
investigations. Also, EPA acknowledges that, while it has authority to initiate
criminal investigations, an EPA case referral to the FBI vests operational control
of the case with the FBI. EPA and the FBI may, however, mutually agree to joint
operational control.
3. See generally The Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg.
25,004 (1986) [hereinafter EPA Audit Policy]; Factors in Decisions on Criminal
Prosecutions for Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Volun-
tary Compliance or Disclosure Efforts by the Violator [hereinafter DOJ Policy
Statement] issued by the DOJ onJuly 1, 1991 (available on request from DOJ).
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cessful environmental enforcement scheme. This principal is rec-
ognized by EPA, which in 1986 issued an Environmental Auditing
Policy Statement 4 (EPA Audit Policy) encouraging the regulated
community to implement environmental audit programs. At long
last, in July 1991, the DOJ published its own policy statement,
describing the mitigating effects a strong corporate environmen-
tal audit policy may have on criminal prosecutorial decisions.5
These policies take on added significance for the regulated com-
munity in light of the legislative trend to require environmental
audit programs in an increasing number of situations. 6
However, both policies fall far short of the benefits to be
gained by both the regulator and the regulated through a volun-
tary disclosure program. Such a program was envisioned by some
members of the regulated community as the "quid pro quo" they
should be given for their self-policing efforts. In general, such a
voluntary disclosure program would involve both the DOJ and
EPA, would be administered on a centralized basis leading to
more uniform civil, criminal and administrative enforcement deci-
sions, and would allow for global resolution of enforcement is-
sues. Such a system would also provide uniform detailed guidance
on how to perform an audit, how to make a disclosure, and what
could be expected in return. Comprehensive voluntary disclosure
programs of this nature already exist; examples are those cur-
rently managed by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 7
4. EPA Audit Policy supra note 3.
5. DOJ Policy Statement, supra note 3, at 1.
6. This trend includes the Clean Water Act (CWA) Reauthorization. For a
more detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see infra notes 30, 32-35 and ac-
companying text.
7. See The Department of Defense Voluntary Disclosure Program - A De-
scription of the Process, issued April 1990 [hereinafter DOD Disclosure Pro-
gram]; Federal Aviation Administration Compliance/Enforcement Bulletin No.
90-6, March 29, 1990.
The Department of Defense (DOD) Voluntary Disclosure Program is a
highly structured system of disclosure. First, the defense contractor wishing to
make a disclosure involving potential criminal and/or civil violations contacts
the Office of Assistant Inspector General for Criminal Investigations, Policy and
Oversight (AIG-CIPO). DOD Disclosure Program at 5. The AIG-CIPO then
makes a preliminary determination to accept or reject the disclosure into the
Voluntary Disclosure Program. Id. If the contractor has made a sufficient disclo-
sure of information, which depends in part on whether the government had
prior knowledge of the disclosed information, the AIG-CIPO will preliminarily
accept the matter into the program. Id. at 5-7. "[Tjhe contractor's continued
participation in the program is contingent on prompt execution of the standard
[Voluntary Disclosure Agreement], and compliance with both this agreement
and requirements issued by the Deputy Secretary of Defense." Id. at 9. The
19921
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The purpose of this article is to examine the DOJ and EPA
policies on environmental audits in the context of determining
what, if any, incentives are offered to undertake such a corporate
soul-baring program. This article will also determine how com-
panies that decide to expose themselves to the government can
retain some control over their fates and not stick themselves in
the criminal "bramblebush." In addition, we will discuss the ben-
efits to be gained by both the regulator and the regulated by im-
plementation of a voluntary disclosure program similar to that
administered by the DOD.
II. THE MAKINGS OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT PROGRAM
The exact parameters of any audit program will vary with the
unique characteristics of the facility or transaction at issue.8 Ini-
tially, one faces the problem of getting experts from different
fields to agree on how a company should shape an environmental
contractor is then advised whether or not the matter has been accepted into or
rejected from the program. Id. at 9-10.
The contractor is encouraged to conduct its own internal audit investigation
and to submit a report describing the findings, and this report must be submit-
ted within 60 days of initial disclosure. Id. at 10. The government may or may
not conduct its own audit or investigation of the contractor. The government
will, however, verify all information provided by the contractor's internal report,
a process is referred to as a "verification audit". Id. at 11. The contractor's coop-
eration in the government's audit and investigation are regarded as essential. Id.
Any civil damages or restitution payments are coordinated through the DOJ's
Civil Division. Id. at 14. The matter can be removed from the program "at any
time during the verification process if" the disclosure is determined not to meet
the program's requirements, or the contractor violates the terms of the Volun-
tary Disclosure Agreement. Id. at 15. The matter is then officially closed after the
investigation is completed, the amount of damages is determined and settled,
and letters indicating the final outcome of any criminal, civil or suspen-
sion/debarment matters are submitted by the appropriate DOD authorities. Id.
at 15-16.
8. There are obvious distinctions between those types of environmental as-
sessments that this article will refer to as "audits," and those that will be referred
to as "compliance assurances." Compliance assurances are a "systematic way of
determining, attaining, and maintaining [plant-level] compliance with applicable
environmental rules and regulations." MALCOM WEISS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, ISSUES OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE IN ENVIRON-
MENTAL AUDITING, 2 (April 1984). In contrast, environmental auditing:
[I]s the evaluation of such compliance assurance activities, designed to
assure that these procedures are in place and working, and to produce
an organized data base. An auditing system enables firms to identify
and correct procedures which lead to noncompliance, and to minimize
delays and costs resulting from a regulator's identification of noncom-
pliance .... It differs from a compliance assurance program primarily
because of its evaluative and corrective capacity.
Id. (citations omitted). In a nutshell, environmental auditing ensures that a com-
pany's compliance assurance programs are functioning as intended.
4
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audit program. An example of potentially different viewpoints is
the pairing of an engineer and an attorney: such conflicts only
grow in complexity when a third point of view is presented, that
of the company employee with fiscal responsibility.
The professional literature abounds with what might seem to
be petty turf battles over the definition of a proper environmental
audit program. In reality the battleground is not semantics, 9 but
rather profound philosophical differences. For instance, engi-
neering consultants are inclined to see environmental assess-
ments as a series of protocols, reports, manuals and computer
databases.' 0 Lawyers, on the other hand, tend to focus on the
legal implications of the information that the environmental audit
program will generate, and will attempt to keep the substance of
internal records, reports and protocols away from the prying eyes
of federal, state, and local governmental entities, competitors,
and citizens' groups.
A good place to begin when describing environmental audit
programs is with the 1986 EPA Audit Policy." Environmental
self-auditing, according to this policy, is "a systematic, docu-
mented, periodic and objective review by regulated entities of fa-
cility operations and practices related to meeting environmental
objectives."' 2 This concept of environmental audits, however,
9. The nomenclature of environmental specialists is not yet standardized.
It is not uncommon to find environmental programs going by a variety of rubrics
with the distinction among them unclear or nonexistent. Audit, survey, compli-
ance assurance, review, appraisal, and evaluation have all won a certain amount
of currency. See, e.g., J. W. Moorman & L. S. Kirsch, Environmental Compliance
Assessments: Why Do Them, How to Do Them, and How Not to Do Them, 26 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 97 (1990) [hereinafter Moorman & Kirsch] (citingJ. GREENO ET
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITING FUNDAMENTALS AND TECHNIQUES 4 (2d ed. 1987)).
10. See, e.g., Frank J. Priznar, Trends in Environmental Auditing 20 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,179 (1990); A. Ronald Baumer, Making Environmental
Audits, CHEMICAL ENGINEERING 101, Nov. 1, 1982. Baumer fails to include cor-
porate counsel as a member of the audit team, which is to be made up exclu-
sively of chemical and mechanical engineers. Id. Failure to include counsel as
an integral member of the audit team, however, will likely have an adverse effect
on a corporation's ability to keep the fruits of the audit privileged and confiden-
tial. Cf David L. Russell, Managing Your Environmental Audit, CHEMICAL ENGI-
NEERING 37, June 24, 1985 [hereinafter Managing Audit] (audit team should
include counsel to insure that the "attorney-client privilege" will apply to pro-
tect sensitive matters, as well as a certified public accountant, engineers and
plant managers). Russell is perhaps overly sanguine about the availability of the
attorney-client privilege to protect the fruits of the audit-reason enough for
corporate counsel to ensure that she insinuates herself into the audit process at
an early stage, and holds tight the reins. Id. For a discussion of potentially ap-
plicable privileges, see infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
11. 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004 (1986).
12. Id. at 25,006 (footnote omitted). The type of compliance audit de-
1992]
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does not include any activities that are mandated by "law, regula-
tion or permits."' 3
The EPA has identified seven elements of a successful envi-
ronmental audit program. They are: (1) "explicit top manage-
ment support for environmental auditing and commitment to
follow-up on audit findings;"' 14 (2) "an environmental auditing
function independent of audited activities;"' 15 (3) "adequate team
staffing and auditor training;"' 16 (4) "explicit audit objectives,
scope, resources, and frequency;"1 7 (5) "a process which collects,
analyzes, interprets and documents information sufficient to
achieve audit objectives;""' (6) "a process which includes specific
scribed by the EPA is distinguishable from the environmental assessment per-
formed as an adjunct to a real estate transaction, which is also commonly called
an "audit." Real estate environmental audits may involve little more than a site
inspection, facility personnel interviews and a records review (often called a
"Phase I" audit). This is followed, only if necessary, by sampling of air and
waste water emissions, an asbestos determination, and a check for environmen-
tal contamination of soil and groundwater. See Douglass F. Rohrman & Michael
J. Hoffman, Environmental Audits: Assessing Environmental Liability in Real Estate
Transactions, ILL. B.J. 690 (Sept. 1989). A real estate environmental audit is not
likely to focus on corrective actions since the ultimate goal is disposal of the
property with a proper allocation of risk for the environmental conditions that
were found to exist through the audit procedure.
13. 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,006.
14. Id. at 25,009. A written policy may demonstrate management support
of such a program, which should pledge support not only for the audit program,
but also for compliance with corporate policies, permit requirements, and fed-
eral, state and local statutes and regulations. EPA also suggests that there be
"an explicit written commitment to follow-up on audit findings to correct identi-
fied problems and prevent their recurrence." Id.
15. Id. The auditors should be without personal, financial or other conflicts
of interest with the audited activity. Their status and organizational reporting
responsibilities should "ensure objective and unobstructed inquiry, observation
and testing." Id.
16. 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,009. Auditors should take advantage of continuing
education and training programs to maintain their competence. Id.
17. Id. The objectives should include "assessing compliance with applica-
ble environmental laws and evaluating the adequacy of internal compliance poli-
cies, procedures and personnel training programs to ensure continued
compliance." Id. The auditors should have access to the facility's permits, perti-
nent regulations covering the facility's activities, and the relevant checklists and
protocols for the facility's processes and procedures. There should be written
procedures detailing how to plan the audit, how to define the scope of the audit,
how to examine and evaluate the findings, how to communicate the findings,
and how to conduct the follow-up. Id.
18. 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,009. In order to provide a sound basis for the au-
dit's conclusions, the information collected should be "sufficient, reliable, rele-
vant and useful." Id. There should be a periodic review of the means used to
identify, measure, classify and report the information on which the auditors, in
turn, will base their audit findings. The information gathering and review pro-
cess should be conducted in such a fashion to maintain audit objectivity and
meet audit goals. Id.
6
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procedures to promptly prepare candid, clear and appropriate
written reports on audit findings, corrective actions, and sched-
ules for implementation;"'19 and (7) "a process which includes
quality assurance procedures to assure the accuracy and thor-
oughness of environmental audits." 20
Inevitably, a thorough environmental audit will find viola-
tions or potential noncompliance situations, because one hun-
dred percent compliance with all relevant environmental
regulations is only theoretically possible, especially at complex,
multi-process, multi-regulated facilities, and at companies with
many geographically dispersed sites. In preparation for this real-
ity, corporate counsel should ensure that, prior to instituting the
audit program, there are procedures describing exactly who is to
receive a copy of the audit report, as well as a clear commitment
from within the corporate structure to deal with the audit
findings.
The identification of the individuals who are to receive copies
of the audit report is an important task. An audit report identify-
ing a possible violation which finds its way to a vice president's
office may involve the recipient in an enforcement investigation,
despite the fact that this particular individual may have no other
source of knowledge regarding the issue. Generally, prosecutors
will expend additional efforts to determine who was the highest
ranking employee involved in the noncompliance situation 2' by
applying the "responsible corporate agent doctrine." 22 Employ-
19. Id. The procedures should ensure that the audit findings are communi-
cated to appropriate managers at both the facility and corporate level who can
evaluate the reports and correct the problems found. Id. Of particular impor-
tance for the subject matter of this article, procedures should also exist "for
determining what internal findings are reportable to state or federal agencies."
Id.
20. 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,009. This can be accomplished "through supervi-
sion, independent internal reviews, external reviews, or a combination of these
approaches." Id.
21. When corporations are prosecuted the highest ranking culpable corpo-
rate official is often indicted as well. See F. Henry Habicht II, The Federal Perspec-
tive on Environmental Criminal Enforcement: How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,478, 10,480 (1987). Of the 215 indictments secured
by DOJ between October 1982 and September 1986, Habicht reports that 65
were against corporations, while 150 were against corporate officers, directors,
or employees. Id.
22. The Supreme Court first articulated the general parameters of the "re-
sponsible corporate agent" doctrine in United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277
(1943), a conviction of the president/general manager of a pharmaceutical com-
pany under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1972).
Although the corporation itself was not convicted, Mr. Dotterweich was, for
three counts of selling misbranded and adulterated drugs. His conviction was
1992]
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ees who receive the reports should therefore be limited to those
with a "need to know"-i.e., those with management or fiscal re-
sponsibility for the facility or both. This includes managers at
both the facility and corporate level.
This is not to suggest that "ignorance is bliss" and that re-
sponsibility for compliance issues may be avoided by not receiv-
ing a copy of the audit report describing the issue. What you do
not know can hurt you. 23 There is a developing body of case law
which holds corporate officers responsible for actions of which
they may have had no direct knowledge under a charge of "reck-
less disregard" of the truth or a "conscious avoidance of the
truth" standard. 24 In addition, having the audit report reviewed
premised upon his position within the pharmaceutical company, rather than any
knowledge he may have had of the illegal transactions. The Court found that he
was of a class of employees with "at least the opportunity of informing them-
selves of the existence of conditions imposed for the protection of consum-
ers ... ." 320 U.S. at 285. The Court otherwise gave little guidance on who
would be a responsible corporate agent, describing as "too treacherous" any
formula defining a "class of employees which stands in such a responsible rela-
tion." Id. Generally, though, "[t]he offense is committed ... by all who ...
[have] a responsible share in the transaction which the statute outlaws .. " Id.
at 284.
Because conviction as a "responsible corporate agent" is position-depen-
dant rather than knowledge-dependent, application of the doctrine has been
largely confined to crimes without a knowledge or intent requirement, or if the
officer exercised a high degree of care in selecting and supervising his delegate.
See generally John F. Seymour, Civil and Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers Under
Federal Environmental Laws, Env't Rep. (BNA) 337, 341 (June 6, 1989) [hereinaf-
ter Seymour]. For the same reason, delegation of one's authority to another to
ensure compliance with statutory mandates is no defense to prosecution as a
responsible corporate agent. See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 670-73
(1974) (where, through a responsible corporate agent's managerial position, the
statute at issue "imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy viola-
tions, but also ... to implement measures that will ensure that violations will not
occur," criminal liability is not premised upon "conscious wrongdoing," and a
failure to act is a sufficient basis for conviction). Accord United States v. Starr,
535 F.2d 512, 515 (9th Cir. 1976) (delegation of authority without follow-up to
ensure that noncompliance was remedied is not a defense to criminal liability of
responsible corporate agent). However, that the responsible corporate agent
was " 'powerless' to prevent or correct the violation" is a defense. Park 421 U.S.
at 673 (citing United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 376 U.S. 86, 91
(1964)).
23. Indeed, Barry Hartman, Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the
DOJ's Environment and Natural Resources Division, has been reported to have
said that the DOJ has a strong prosecutorial interest in persons who ignore
problems that are indicated by audits. The DOJ intends to prosecute persons
who rely on their "willful blindness" to environmental problems as a shield from
environmental liability. See DO] Plans to Issue Policy Statement on Use of Corporate
Environmental Audits, Env't Rep. (BNA) 484 (June 21, 1991).
24. Also known as "deliberate avoidance," "studied ignorance," or "the os-
trich defense", courts have long acknowledged that deliberate avoidance of
knowledge of an illegality by failure to investigate a situation is as bad as knowl-
8
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by the appropriate people with fiscal and oversight responsibility
will help validate the company's environmental audit program in
the eyes of the DOJ and EPA.
As part of the corporate commitment to deal with the audit
findings, a pre-determined program of dealing with such findings
should be in place. First, a means for handling disagreements be-
tween the business and the audit team regarding audit results, in-
terpretation or conclusions, or both, should be established.2 5
This should occur whether the audit is performed by an internal
or external team.26 Second, mechanisms should be in place to
edge of the crime itself. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416 n.29
(1970); Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728, 735 (1899); United States v. Ram-
sey, 785 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom.; McCreary v. United States,
476 U.S. 1186 (1986); United States v.Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
25. See Managing Audit, supra note 10, gives clear, practical advice for ad-
dressing such situations, which arise frequently enough to merit standard post-
audit procedures, including:
1. Insist upon an exit interview between plant management, partici-
pating supervisory staff, and the audit team. Discuss the auditors'
work, their findings, and what their report will contain.
2. Insist that the report be marked "Preliminary" until after the plant
management and the company attorney have had a chance to re-
view it and make written comments.
3. When the report is issued, read it at least twice. The first reading'
should be for overall impression; during the second, look for detail
and fact. Determine not only what is said but also what is implied.
4. Challenge all unsupported statements and conclusions. Enforce-
ment personnel and (less frequently, perhaps) consultants may
sometimes make observations that are outside of their expertise or
scope of work, and these unsupported comments can be inter-
preted as a legal notification that a particular situation exists. An
unsupported statement can come back to haunt you.
5. Create a "positive-response paper trail" on all audit recommenda-
tions. The auditors will generally recommend specific areas for fur-
ther investigation, which might include implementation of
procedural controls or installation of equipment. Consider all of
the recommendations seriously, and document the consideration
- even if the documentation merely says that the plant has studied
the audit report and has found that the technology to solve the
problem does not exist. Make sure, however, that the engineering
group has studied the recommendation and that it does support
the conclusion.
6. Respond positively. It does little good if the paper trail of positive
response does not result in specific actions. Procedural controls
cost little to implement, and large capital projects can often be
phased in. Translate the auditors' recommendations into the plant
capital budget, and let others decide how much can be spent and
on what.
Id.
26. The EPA Audit Policy acknowledges that "[a]udits can be conducted
effectively by independent internal or third party auditors." 51 Fed. Reg. at
25,006. To maintain the independence of an internal audit team, auditors
19921
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ensure that the audit findings are not left to fester, tucked away in
someone's filing cabinet, long forgotten. Such audit reports may
later become the stereotypical "smoking gun" that every enforce-
ment official dreams of finding. Audit findings should be dealt
with, which includes not only rectifying situations reported, but
also conducting additional tests or reviews when necessary, par-
ticularly if a dispute arises regarding the findings, interpretations
or conclusions. 27
III. MANDATORY VERSUS DISCRETIONARY ENVIRONMENTAL
AUDIT PROGRAMS
Implicit in the above discussion is the fact that the creation of
an audit program meeting EPA's standards involves a corporate
commitment of both time and money. When one also takes into
account the audit program's potential for creating a paper trail
for the regulator, the obvious question from the company's per-
spective is "why perform an audit?" The purpose of this section
is to discuss those occasions when environmental audit programs
may be mandated by law or as part of an enforcement scheme, as
should at least report through a separate chain of command. For example, to
ensure independent and candid assessments, the members of the audit team
should not have to critique their own bosses.
27. In the future, lawyers may be hesitant to advise clients as to what does
or does not constitute an environmental violation due to a felony complaint filed
in Solano County, California against eight defendants, including a San Francisco
law firm and one of its associates. See California v. InFerGene Co., No. 096922,
Cal. Mun. Ct., Solano County (May 30, 1991). In that case, one of the law firm's
corporate clients was evicted from their rented warehouse at about the same
time they were filing for bankruptcy. The associate wrote a letter to the client's
landlord saying that the client could not remove the hazardous waste it left be-
hind. The letter stated that the client claimed "no further interest" in the waste
since a writ of possession was executed on behalf of the landlord and against the
warehouse, and that the client could not pay to dispose of the waste as that
would constitute a pre-petition claim, violating bankruptcy law. Ironically, it was
the corporate client that contacted the California state environmental agency,
which led to the local District Attorney's Office (DA's Office) getting involved. A
Bankruptcy Judge ruled in May 1991 that the DA's office could prosecute the
corporate client, the law firm and the associate. While all charges against the
attorneys were eventually dismissed or withdrawn, the Solano County environ-
mental prosecutor has stated that he may go to a county grand jury seeking new
charges. See Susan Kostal, InFerGene Admits It Had Role in Dumping, S.F. DAILY J.,
Oct. 9, 1991, at 2.
While it has always been the case that a lawyer may be prosecuted for coun-
seling a client to violate the law, the Solano County case instead sought to im-
pose criminal liability for advice that was ostensibly given in good faith. The
concern is that due to the lower standard of criminal intent necessary for envi-
ronmental prosecutions, there may be additional prosecutions of lawyers for giv-
ing advice with which regulators may disagree. See 77 ABA J., at 16 & 18 (Sept.
1991) (further discussion of InFerGene case).
10
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol3/iss1/4
ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT PROGRAMS
opposed to those situations when a company may still exercise its
discretion in developing a voluntary environmental audit pro-
gram. Section IV of this article addresses the question of "why"
by exploring what, if anything, is to be gained by instituting such
a program.
EPA believes there are "sound business reasons" for envi-
ronmental audit programs, which can serve "as a means of help-
ing regulated entities manage pollution control affirmatively over
time instead of reacting to crises." 28 The EPA Audit Policy
stresses the voluntary nature of a corporate audit program and
EPA's intention, at least in 1986, when it issued its Audit Policy,
to not mandate auditing. 29 Instead of requiring such programs,
EPA subtly points out that "ultimate responsibility for the envi-
ronmental performance of the facility lies with top management,
which therefore has a strong incentive to use reasonable means,
such as environmental auditing, to secure reliable information of
facility compliance status." 30 In other words, to avoid being
blindsided by application of the "responsible corporate agent"
doctrine and "conscious disregard" theories, corporate manage-
ment should seriously consider the institution of an environmen-
tal audit program.3'
The voluntary nature of audit programs may be falling by the
wayside, as increasing numbers of businesses find themselves fac-
ing mandatory environmental audit program requirements. The
EPA Audit Policy sets forth EPA's intent to include environmental
audit program provisions in consent decrees when it believes an
audit program "could provide a remedy for identified problems
and reduce the likelihood of similar problems occurring in the
future."32
Recent proposed legislation indicates Congress' attempts to
increase the number of occasions when audit programs will be
required. The Wofford Amendment to the Federal Omnibus Vio-
lent Crime Control Act of 1991 [Crime Control Act], approved by
the United States Senate in July 1991, would have authorized the
federal courts to require a corporation convicted of an environ-
mental offense to pay for an environmental compliance audit.
The audit would also have included recommendations to prevent
28. 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,006.
29. Id. at 25,007.
30. Id. at 25,006-07.
31. For a discussion of the responsible corporate agent doctrine, see supra
note 24 and accompanying text.
32. 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,007 (footnote omitted).
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future offenses, and the corporation would be required to comply
with the recommendations.3 3 The House of Representatives,
however, passed its own version of the Crime Control Act without
the audit requirement, and the amendment has been deleted by a
joint conference committee. As proposed, the Clean Water Act
Reauthorization will require holders of National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) permits to implement audit
programs to be conducted by "certified" firms, persons or organi-
zations. 34 The audits must "identify necessary steps and an ap-
propriate schedule for improving the degree and extent of
compliance," and the audit reports will be made available to the
public.3 5
The relevancy of a discussion of the repercussions of per-
forming an environmental audit increases when one recognizes
this movement toward mandatory audit programs. However, the
benefits to be gained by performing the mandatory audit and re-
porting discovered violations will decrease if the audit require-
ment carries with it a violation reporting requirement, or a
direction that all such reports be turned over to EPA. The self-
reporting will then not be viewed as voluntary.
IV. WHAT IS GAINED BY CONDUCTING AN ENVIRONMENTAL
AUDIT PROGRAM?
Regardless of whether an audit program is mandatory or vol-
untary, a legitimate question that will consistently arise is "what is
to be gained by performing the audit?" This section discusses
whether the audit reports may be protected from discovery and
whether the environmental audit program may be used as a de-
fensive tool by the corporation.
A. The Downside of Audits: Discoverability of Audit Reports
An integral part of any auditing or self-policing program is
33. S. 1241, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) contains the Senate's version of
the Federal Omnibus Violent Crime Control Act (Act). The House's version of
the Act is found in H.R. 3371, 102nd Cong. 1st Sess. (1991). A conference re-
port describes the final deletion of the Wofford Amendment. H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 405, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
34. Water Pollution Control Act of 1991, S. 1081, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 520 at 168. S. 1081 contemplates that certification will be granted for a ten
year period under the auspices of an EPA administered program. Id. at 175.
35. Id. Trade secrets and processes, along with operational and financial
information protected under 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (regulating the disclosure of con-
fidential information by public officers and employees), will remain confidential.
S. 1081, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., § 520 at 175 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1984)).
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the generation of a paper trail that may document potential envi-
ronmental noncompliance. Such specific and detailed informa-
tion would be invaluable to the government's criminal
prosecution of a corporation and its employees since documented
noncompliance goes a long way toward proving the "general in-
tent" requirement found in environmental statutes.3 6
The audit report is also likely to contain proprietary business
information regarding finances, production processes and tech-
nology, or otherwise sensitive business information. The report
may provide the factual basis for citizen suits, expose financial
or trade secrets to competitors, or even sacrifice a valued em-
ployee's Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. 37
Corporate counsel must deal with the issue of whether such
potentially damaging information can be kept confidential even
after a disclosure has been made to the government. 38 Prelimina-
36. The current understanding of criminal provisions of federal environ-
mental statutes is that they differ from most other crimes in that it is not neces-
sary to demonstrate that the defendant had a specific intent to commit the
offense; they are general intent crimes, and conviction is premised on the de-
fendant's knowledge or mere volitional conduct. Removing the specific intent
requirement from environmental prosecution significantly decreases the burden
on the prosecutor, since general intent may be proven merely by showing that a
defendant was conscious of her actions, whereas specific intent is proven by
showing not merely that she was conscious of her actions, but also that she knew
her actions were illegal. Prosecutors have successfully argued that violations of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6900 - 6992k
(1988), are general intent crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741
(4th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, - U.S. -, I I I S. Ct. 1307 (1991); United States v.
Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990); United
States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1208 (1985). See also United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir.
1988).
37. Such employees might then perceive themselves as no longer valuable,
except perhaps as scapegoats, thus creating an incentive for them to turn their
loyalties away from the company and toward the government. One commenta-
tor, however, has suggested that an audit mandated by statute or regulation may
amount to direct government compulsion of self-incriminating testimony, thus
tainting environmental criminal protections. See Edmund B. Frost, Voluntary En-
vironmental Compliance Audit: A DOJ Policy Failure, Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 499, 501-
02 (Sept. 18, 1991). Note that while corporations themselves cannot benefit
from the Fifth Amendment privilege, their employees can, creating an innate
tension that the corporation should affirmatively attempt to defuse, not aggra-
vate. See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 383-85 (1911); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 58 (1905).
38. Counsel will also want to protect the confidentiality of self-policing in-
formation because evidence of noncompliance may be used not only in criminal
prosecutions by the government, but also in private actions under the citizen
suits provisions allowable under most of the federal environmental statues, in
private toxic tort suits, and in civil or criminal actions brought by local govern-
mental environmental enforcement authorities. Once disclosed to the federal
13
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rily, it appears that the privileges normally used by attorneys to
protect client communications and internal investigations from
disclosure, such as the attorney-client privilege and the attorney
work-product doctrine, in most instances will not be available to
protect an environmental audit or other technical, self-policing
report.
1. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege, which protects confidential
communications between an attorney and her client, is the oldest
acknowledged privilege. It arose at common law to ensure a free
exchange of information that would enable the attorney to pro-
vide informed advice. 39 Communications between corporate
counsel and an employee, which occur for the purpose of counsel
gaining information in order to provide legal advice to the corpo-
ration, are protected as part of the attorney-client privilege be-
tween the corporation and the lawyer. 40 However, a company
may see little need in involving counsel: in run-of-the-mill com-
pliance assurance programs, and even many audits, the essential
focus is often on an evaluation of existing processes and proce-
dures, rather than on employee interviews. As a practical matter,
counsel will normally not have the necessary expertise to conduct
the detailed, technical questioning required in an audit. Nor will
a company want to incur on a regular basis the additional costs
associated with involving counsel in carrying out the audit
procedures.
For these reasons, counsel may not be involved in compli-
ance assurance or environmental auditing, so the privilege will
not apply. Furthermore, by emphasizing technical issues on
which counsel is unqualified to opine, the necessary nexus that
the attorney-client privilege requires between an audit or compli-
ance report and the rendering of legal advice may not be met
government, such information could be made available to the public through the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). Note, however,
that FOIA explicitly does not apply to "privileged or confidential" trade secret,
commercial or financial information in an agency's possession, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(6)(C)(b)(4), or to "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement
purposes." Such limitations on FOIA, however, apply only to the extent that
producing such information would interfere with enforcement proceedings, de-
prive a person of the right to a fair trial, disclose a confidential source or law
enforcement technique, or endanger the life or safety of an individual. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(6)(C)(b)(7).
39. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
40. Id. at 395.
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even in audits that involve counsel.4' Another potential problem
with the attorney-client privilege is that it does not preclude the
employee from speaking to others about his conversation with the
attorney, thereby breaching the confidentiality requirement. Ad-
ditionally, even if counsel conducts the interviews, the audit re-
port itself may not be covered by the attorney-client privilege
since the privilege protects only communications, not underlying
facts .42
2. Work-Product Privilege
In order for the attorney work-product privilege to apply to
an audit report and protect it from involuntary disclosure, the au-
dit must have been conducted in anticipation of litigation, and the
report must be generated by the attorney or one acting at the
request and direction of the attorney. 43 It will also be difficult to
argue that a report generated as part of a regular audit program
constitutes work performed in anticipation of litigation. 44
3. Critical Self-Evaluation Privilege
A relative newcomer to the field of privilege is the "critical
self-evaluation privilege," which has been baptized under differ-
ent names by different courts and commentators, each anxious to
put their own spin on the subject.45 However, no matter what the
name, courts have identified three core criteria required for appli-
cation of this privilege: (1) the protected information must result
from the claimant's critical self-evaluation; (2) there must be a
strong public interest in preserving a free flow of the type of in-
41. Merely having an attorney on an environmental audit team will not nec-
essarily bring an audit, even one involving employee interviews, within the attor-
ney-client privilege if the attorney does not render legal assistance. See United
States v. Chevron, No. 88-6681, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12267 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16,
1989) (attorney on audit team was merely business advisor; therefore audit re-
port was not privileged).
42. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395 (quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).
43. See generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024 (1970, Supp. 1991) [hereinafter WRIGHT &
MILLER]. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Like the attorney-client privilege, the
work-product privilege does not protect underlying facts - only documents or
other tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation. See generally, WRIGHT
& MILLER § 2023.
44. The privilege does not cover documents prepared in the regular course
of business, even if litigation "is already in prospect . "WRIGHT & MILLER
§ 2024.
45. See generally, Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1083, 1086 n.14 (1983).
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formation for which protection is sought; and (3) free flow of this
information would be curtailed if left unprotected. 46
This privilege has not yet been acknowledged in the environ-
mental self-policing area, nor has it been recognized by most ju-
risdictions. Of particular importance for our analysis, courts
generally do not recognize the privilege when the documents in
question are sought by a governmental agency, a category that
includes EPA.4 7 Due to the tenuous nature of this privilege, it
cannot be relied upon as a means by which the audit report can be
kept from discovery.
The foregoing discussion may suggest that maintaining the
confidential character of internal self-policing reports is futile.
This is certainly the case when the audit or compliance assurance
process is designed without giving any thought to the possible
availability of these privileges. By designing internal self-policing
programs with the privileges in mind, however, the chance of
keeping confidential information under cover should be signifi-
cantly increased. Clients, nevertheless, should neither forget to
put counsel in the loop, thereby losing the privilege, nor over-
involve counsel in each facet of an audit, thereby compromising
the EPA Audit Policy criterion that auditors be "independent.- 48
B. Protections Provided by Agency Goodwill
The EPA has stated that "as a matter of policy, [it] will not
46. See id. See also Peterson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 112 F.R.D. 360,
363 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
The EPA "acknowledges [that] regulated entities need to self-evaluate envi-
ronmental performance with some measure of privacy and encourages such ac-
tivity." 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,007. However, the EPA has also expressed its
opposition to any codification or formalization of a self-evaluation privilege. See
Letter from James M. Strock, Assistant Administrator of EPA, to Representative
Richard F. Mutzenbaugh, Chairman, House State Affairs Committee, Colorado
(February 14, 1990) (opposing Colorado's attempt to codify the self-evaluation
privilege).
47. See FTC v. T.R.W., Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Relying on
a Second Circuit opinion issued in United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir.
1978), the T. R. W. court found an additional reason to deny application of the
privilege: the documents were sought by the government, via an FTC subpoena
issued pursuant to the FTC's broad investigatory and subpoena powers. In the
Noall case, the court had found that the self-evaluation privilege did not apply in
response to an IRS production order. More recently, in United States v. Dexter,
132 F.R.D. 8 (D. Conn. 1990), the court held that there was no qualified privi-
lege against disclosure of self-evaluative documents in a suit brought by EPA
pursuant to the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(b), 1319(d), &
1321(b)(6)(B).
48. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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routinely request environmental audit reports." 49 The EPA will,
however, request a report when it "determines it is needed to ac-
complish a statutory mission, or where the Government deems it
to be material to a criminal investigation." 50 The examples listed
in the EPA Audit Policy describing situations in which EPA may
request an audit report, or a portion thereof, emphasize the
rather elusive power EPA claims to possess. The agency may re-
quest reports when "audits are conducted under consent decrees
or other settlement agreements; when a company has placed its
management practices at issue by raising them as a defense; or
when state of mind or intent are a relevant element of inquiry,
such as during a criminal investigation. '" 5 1
In other words, there are no guarantees that EPA will not
seek a copy of an audit report, or at the very least some selected
portions. Furthermore, there are no guarantees that audit re-
ports will not be sought by state enforcement agencies, 52 or that
they will be protected from disclosure in response to a discovery
request raised during a citizen suit.5 3
49. 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,007. However, some environmental practitioners
have reported "that audit documents are routinely seized by EPA criminal inves-
tigators whenever such documents are known or suspected to exist and may re-
late in some way to the ongoing investigation." James R. Moore, et al., Why Risk
Criminal Charges by Performing Environmental Audits?, Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 503
(Sept. 18, 1991).
50. 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,007.
51. Id.
52. While the DOJ Policy Statement applies only to criminal noncompli-
ance situations, one would be hard-pressed to think of a situation where a fed-
eral civil/administrative noncompliance situation would not have at least the
potential for involving a state criminal or civil issue.
53. Most of the major federal environmental statutes contain provisions al-
lowing private parties to seek enforcement of the statute against noncomplying
entities. The CWA, for example, states that, after giving sixty days notice to the
EPA or the state agency implementing the NPDES permit program:
any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency.. .) who is alleged to be
in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter
or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to
such a standard or limitation.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1991).
The factual basis for citizen suits is often found exclusively in reports that
regulated entities have filed with the government and to which the public may
gain access, e.g., through a FOIA request. See supra note 38. For instance,
NPDES permittees under the CWA are required by their permits to maintain
Discharge Monitoring Reports (DMR's), which must be filed with the permitting
agency. DMR's will chronicle permit violations that can form the basis of citi-
zens' suits. See, e.g., Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1980), remanded, 844 F.2d 170 (4th Cir. 1988),judgment rein-
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The topic of "discoverability of the audit report" must in-
clude a discussion of when the audit findings should be reported
to federal or state authorities. When a reporting violation is dis-
covered, a failure to notify the proper agencies only increases the
magnitude of the problem.5 4 As discussed below, in order to
comply with the DOJ's new policies, the disclosure of a noncom-
pliance situation must be made in a timely and complete fash-
ion.55 The question that arises is this: after performing the self-
policing function strongly supported by the regulatory authorities
and creating the paper trail that reveals all the company's blem-
ishes, and after the corporation has been stripped naked of all
protections, what control does one have over how the govern-
ment will use information which has been neatly compiled in the
audit report?
C. Is There Credit for Self-Reporting?
While making no promises, the EPA Audit Policy provides
two incentives for conducting audits and for reporting violations.
First, facilities with a good compliance history, including audit
programs, may be subject to fewer inspections. Second, when
EPA is determining its response to a violation, it will take into
account the company's efforts to avoid and correct problems. 56
On July 1, 1991 the long awaited DOJ pronouncement on the
role to be played by environmental audit programs was issued in
the form of a policy statement entitled "Factors in Decisions on
Criminal Prosecutions for Environmental Violations in the Con-
text of Significant Voluntary Compliance or Disclosure Efforts by
the Violator" (DOJ Policy Statement). 57 The purpose of the DOJ
Policy Statement is to ensure that the DOJ exercises its discretion
in a consistent fashion, and also to encourage self-auditing, self-
policing and voluntary disclosure by the regulated community. 58
The specific factors described in the policy should be used by
all United States Attorneys to determine whether and how to
prosecute. Furthermore, the DOJ Policy Statement is clear on at
stated, 688 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 890 F.2d
690 (4th Cir. 1989).
54. For instance, many environmental statutes impose civil penalties per
day of violation. See, e.g., CWA § 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319.
55. See infra text accompanying note 60. See also DOJ Policy Statement,
supra note 3.
56. 51 Fed. Reg. at 25,007.
57. See DOJ Policy Statement, supra note 3.
58. See id. at 1-2.
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least one point: it is unlikely that any one factor will be dispositive
in this determination. 59
When making environmental prosecutorial decisions, the
DOJ will now judge a potential corporate criminal defendant's
conduct in the following four areas:
(1) Voluntary Disclosure - The company must disclose the po-
tential violation in a voluntary, timely and complete manner. The
DOJ will consider whether the disclosure is made promptly after
the discovery; will determine both the quality and quantity of the
information provided; will decide whether the information sup-
plied substantially aided the government; and will determine
whether the disclosure occurred before a government agency had
knowledge of the situation. A disclosure will not be considered to
be voluntary if it is required by law, regulation or permit.60
(2) Cooperation - The company or individual must be willing
to make all relevant information, including the complete results
of its investigation and all witnesses' names, available to the gov-
ernment. The DOJ will consider the degree, timeliness, extent
and quality of the cooperation exhibited by the disclosing entity.
(3) Preventive Measures and Compliance Programs - The DOJ will
also consider "the existence and scope of any regularized, inten-
sive and comprehensive environmental compliance program." A
company's program should include the means to identify and pre-
vent future noncompliance, and should be adopted in good faith
and in a timely manner.61
59. See id.
60. Id. at 3. In addition to the continued movement towards mandating au-
dits themselves, see supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text, many environmen-
tal statutes already impose a mandatory duty to report releases of pollutants to
environmental regulators. See, e.g., CWA § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(B)(5)
(failure to report the discharge of oil or a hazardous substance to the appropri-
ate agency is misdemeanor); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act (EPCRA) § 325(b), 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b) (1988) (failure to report to
the local Emergency Planning Committee the release of certain hazardous sub-
stances that will result in exposure of persons off-site is subject to civil, misde-
meanor, and felony penalties); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1988)
(failure to notify the National Response Center of the release of hazardous sub-
stances is a felony, punishable by up to three years imprisonment for a first
offense).
61. When applying this particular factor the DOJ will ask:
Was there a strong institutional policy to comply with all environmental
requirements? Had safeguards beyond those required by existing law
been developed and implemented to prevent noncompliance from oc-
curring? Were there regular procedures, including internal or external
compliance management audits, to evaluate, detect, prevent and rem-
edy circumstances like those that led to the noncompliance? Were
19921
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(4) Additional Factors Which May Be Relevant - As part of this
catch-all factor, the DOJ will look at the pervasiveness of the non-
compliance at issue,62 the internal disciplinary action taken
against those employees involved in the noncompliance, 63 and
subsequent compliance efforts made by the reporting entity.64
One gap in the DOJ Policy Statement is whether some factors
may be weighted more heavily than others in the DOJ's enforce-
ment calculus. If we do not know how to answer these questions,
it cannot fairly be said that DOJ has met its goal "of giv[ing] fed-
eral prosecutors direction concerning the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in environmental criminal cases and en-
sur[ing] that such discretion is exercised consistently
nationwide." 65
Apparently the DOJ believes its laundry list of speculative
questions that it will ask when evaluating a company's compliance
program will assist counsel and management in developing a
company's environmental audit program. It is arguable that this
approach to providing information is also not in keeping with
DOJ's stated goal, "to give the regulated community a sense of
how the federal government exercises its prosecutorial discretion
with respect to use of environmental audits and other procedures
to assure compliance with applicable environmental laws and reg-
there procedures and safeguards to ensure the integrity of an audit
conducted? Did the audit evaluate all sources of pollution (i.e., all me-
dia), including the possibility of cross-media transfers of pollutants?
Were the auditor's recommendations implemented in a timely fashion?
Were adequate resources committed to the auditing program and to
implementing its recommendations? Was environmental compliance a
standard by which employees and corporate departmental performance
was judged?
DOJ Policy Statement, supra note 3, at 4-5.
62. When applying the "pervasiveness of noncompliance factor," DOJ will
consider "the number and level of employees participating in the unlawful activ-
ities and the obviousness, seriousness, duration, history and frequency of non-
compliance." Id. at 5.
63. When applying the "internal disciplinary action" factor, DOJ will con-
sider "whether there was an effective system of discipline for employees who
violated company environmental compliance policies" and whether it estab-
lished "an awareness in other employees that unlawful conduct would not be
condoned." Id.
64. When applying the "subsequent compliance efforts" factor, DOJ will
consider the promptness and completeness of such efforts. "Considerable
weight should be given to prompt, good-faith efforts to reach environmental
compliance agreements with federal or state authorities, or both. Full compli-
ance with such agreements should be a factor in any decision whether to prose-
cute." Id. at 5-6.
65. DOJ Policy Statement, supra note 3, at 1.
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ulations." 66 More actual guidance and less rhetoric would un-
doubtedly be useful to the regulated community.
The new DOJ Policy Statement also includes "illustrative ex-
amples," which are set forth to help provide guidance to both en-
forcement officials and the regulated community when evaluating
criminal cases. It is important to note that the DOJ Policy State-
ment warns that even if a company meets all the criteria, there are
no guarantees that the company will not be criminally prosecuted.
In addition, the regulated community must bear in mind that the
DOJ Policy Statement does not apply to civil enforcement actions,
nor does it provide any protection whatsoever from state enforce-
ment actions or from citizen lawsuits. 67
The significance of the DOJ Policy Statement should not be
lost in a discussion of what it does not accomplish. The Policy
Statement is a first step, one which took the DOJ five years to
develop after EPA first published its final Audit Policy. It is still
too early to determine whether the DOJ's theoretical guidelines
will translate into concrete incentives for companies to institute
environmental audit programs and to self-report potential viola-
tions. It is interesting to note that even before the issuance of the
DOJ Policy Statement, Congress made a much stronger pro-
nouncement in favor of environmental audit programs. In the
October 1990 Conference Report for the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments, Congress stated that the EPA Administrator and Attorney
General should refrain from using information obtained during a
voluntarily initiated environmental audit against the person con-
ducting the audit to prove the "knowledge" element of the Clean
Air Act Amendment's criminal provisions if such information is
immediately transmitted to the proper authorities. 68 Perhaps the
66. Id.
67. For a discussion of citizen lawsuits, see discussion supra at note 53.
68. S. 1081, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. (1990). Due to the significance of the
exact Conference Report language on this issue, it has been set forth below in
full:
Nothing in this subsection is intended to discourage owners or op-
erators of sources subject to this Act from conducting self-evaluations
or self-audits and acting to correct any problems identified. On the
contrary, the environmental benefits from such review and prompt cor-
rective action are substantial, and section 113 should be read to en-
courage self-evaluations and self-audits.
Owners and operators of sources are in the best position to iden-
tify deficiencies and correct them, and should be encouraged to adopt
procedures where internal compliance audits are performed and man-
agement is informed. Such internal audits will improve the owners'
and operators' ability to identify and correct problems before rather
1992]
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DOJ will carry through with this thought when applying the DOJ
Policy Statement and making prosecutorial decisions.
V. DISCLOSURE AT WHAT PRICE?
Some commentators, in addition to EPA and DOJ officials,
take the position that a central, formalized voluntary disclosure
program for the environmental arena is not practical. Reasons
given include the facts that there are too many regulated entities
and too many potential violations for such a program to work,
and that pressure would be created to submit routine matters to
government regulators for dispensation.69
It may very well be that the additional costs of examining
each small claim is not justified by the incremental social utility of
the disclosure. These complaints beg the issue, however, because
for the DOJ Policy Statement to apply in the first instance, there
must have been a timely voluntary disclosure. A formal voluntary
disclosure program, such as the one administered by the DOD, 70
merely provides a framework within which to make the disclosure.
Since the DOJ Policy Statement is only in its infancy, it is still
possible that the DOJ will apply it in much the same way as a
voluntary disclosure program would operate. In the meantime,
the corporate client is looking for the answers. With the environ-
ment now a high profile political issue, 7' governmental enforce-
than after, government inspections and other enforcement actions are
needed.
Voluntarily initiated environmental audits should be encouraged
and, in the course of exercising prosecutorial discretion under the
criminal provisions of subsection 113(c), the Administrator and the At-
torney General of the United States should, as a general matter, refrain
from using information obtained by a person in the course of a volunta-
rily initiated environmental audit against such person to prove the
knowledge element of a violation of this Act if - (1) such person imme-
diately transmitted or caused the transmission of such information to
the Administrator or the State air pollution control authorities, as ap-
propriate; (2) such person corrected or caused the correction of such
violation as quickly as possible; and (3) in the case of a violation that
presented an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health
or welfare or the environment, such person immediately eliminated or
caused the elimination of such endangerment to assure prompt protec-
tion of public health or welfare or the environment.
Id.
69. See, e.g., Donald A. Carr, Environmental Audits: Justice's New Policy
Promises BetterJustice, 16July 29, 1991 at 16 (unpublished seminar materials).
70. For a discussion of the merits of the Department of Defense's voluntary
disclosure program, see supra note 7.
71. See, e.g., Keith Schneider, The Environmental Impact of President Bush, N.Y.
TIMES, August 25, 1991, § 4, at 4; Paul Harris, Rising Tide of Water Issue's Vie for
Capitol's Attention, 2 ENV'T TODAY 1 (Oct. 1991).
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ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT PROGRAMS
ment efforts are likely to increase at the same time as
environmental regulations increase in both number and scope.
Employees are concerned that they too, will become defendants
in criminal enforcement actions as the courts apply a lower mens
rea requirement for environmental crimes. 72 Corporate officers
do not want to provide a road map for the regulators, while at the
same time they are concerned that what they do not know might
hurt them. Environmental audits may be the answer, but at what
price? For the company to have any hope of avoiding criminal
prosecution, they must turn over not only the audit report itself,
but also the names of employees responsible for the noncompli-
ance situation, and must take appropriate disciplinary action
against those employees.
How would a voluntary disclosure program help? First, it
would require a commitment from both EPA and DOJ to partici-
pate in such a program and to support business' self-policing and
self-reporting efforts. A centralized function would need to be
created to receive noncompliance reports. The hope would be
that this would lead to uniform application of environmental reg-
ulations, something which is lacking today. The DOJ will never
promise to grant amnesty for all businesses that self-report.
However, as a practical matter, in order to encourage companies
to implement compliance programs and perform self-policing
functions, the DOJ should be hesitant to pursue criminal sanc-
tions against those companies whose self-reporting is accepted
into a voluntary disclosure program. A voluntary disclosure pro-
gram involving both EPA and DOJ would also be a means by
which to effect comprehensive settlements for potential noncom-
pliance situations. Administrative, civil and criminal concerns
could be dealt with all at the same time.
It is not unusual for clients, when faced with the decisions of
whether to institute a self-policing program and/or whether to
disclose a potential violation, to wonder whether their competi-
tors are also incurring the costs of administering a compliance or
audit program, and are also self-reporting. The concern is that
even if the competitor is incurring the costs of an audit program,
if they are not also disclosing noncompliance results, they are
avoiding the burden of potential fines and penalties and are
thereby gaining favor in the eyes of the regulator who is unaware
72. For a further discussion of the lower mens rea requirement for environ-
mental crimes, see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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of their internal problems. 73
A voluntary disclosure program is at least an attempt to put
everyone on an even playing field. If modeled after the DOD pro-
gram, it would require that companies become signatories to an
agreement by which they commit to a self-policing program, and
to self-reporting. From the government's perspective the pro-
gram would lead to the discovery of what would otherwise be un-
detected noncompliance behavior. More importantly, it would
lead to a stronger enforcement scheme, one actively involving
corporate citizens.
There are, of course, foreseeable issues to be worked out. A
settlement with EPA and DOJ may not reach the status of a com-
prehensive resolution because in the environmental arena, state
regulatory agencies will also have jurisdiction over many compli-
ance-related situations. It may be necessary, in order to prevent
the program from being overwhelmed, to create separate pro-
grams for different types of violations or for the different indus-
tries involved. With regard to the former, issues could range
from the disposal and storage of hazardous materials, to under-
ground tanks, to wastewater treatment and to air emissions - all
topics that cut across industry lines. As to the types of business
covered by environmental regulations, the spectrum runs from
the "mom and pop" corner grocery store with one gas pump, to
waste haulers, to chemical manufacturers, to morticians, to hospi-
tals and to research institutions.
To achieve the twin goals of self-policing and self-reporting,
the government must recognize a basic fact of business life, which
is that more and clearer guidelines must be built into the system
in order to encourage companies to perform these self-regulatory
functions. The DOJ Policy Statement is a starting point, and
should be used as a stepping stone. It should not be the final
word on these complex issues. It is currently reported that EPA is
reviewing its Environmental Audit Policy Statement, and the reg-
ulated community hopes efforts there are being directed to more
clearly defining the role of an environmental audit program and
self-reporting.
73. For a discussion of the potential penalties for failure to report a viola-
tion, see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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